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This paper examines the government spending multiplier when economic agents combine adaptive
learning and knowledge about future fiscal policy to form their expectations. The analysis shows
that the effects of a government spending shock substantially change when the rational expectations
hypothesis is replaced by this learning mechanism. In contrast to the dynamics under rational ex-
pectations, a government spending shock in a small-scale new Keynesian DSGE model with learning
crowds in private consumption and is associated with a positive co-movement between real wages
and hours worked. In the baseline calibration, the output multiplier under learning is above one and
about twice as large as under rational expectations.
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1 Introduction
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, countries around the world have tried to fight
the recession with a series of fiscal policy measures. Many governments have adopted a broad range
of expansionary measures such as large tax cuts, boosts in direct spending and various investment pro-
grammes. Conversely, other countries have embarked on fiscal austerity measures, because of concerns
about the sustainability of public finances. This revival of fiscal policy has renewed the debate on the
effects of discretionary fiscal policy.
A central issue in this debate is the size of the government spending multiplier. Although the empir-
ical estimates are dispersed over a broad range, the estimates are in many cases higher than those found
in theoretical business cycle models. Based on a comprehensive review of the empirical literature Ramey
(2011) concludes that the multiplier is probably between 0.8 and 1.5. Moreover, several studies find a
large positive response of private consumption to a government spending shock – see for example Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Galí et al. (2007), and Perotti (2008). This stands in
sharp contrast with the crowding out of consumption and the much smaller multipliers in most theoretical
models.
An important question is to what extent these small multipliers depend on the hypothesis of rational
expectations. This paper addresses this question by comparing the rational expectations benchmark with
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a model where agents form expectations using an adaptive learning mechanism and knowledge about
future fiscal policy.
The hypothesis of rational expectations presumes that agents fully oversee the structure of the model
and do not face any computational limitations in deriving expectations. In contrast, the adaptive learning
approach discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), introduces a more plausible view of rationality.
It is a convenient approach to model bounded rationality by assuming that agents form expectations
based on estimated forecasting models and update the coefficients in these models over time as new data
becomes available.
It seems very natural to assume that agents have no perfect knowledge concerning the general equi-
librium effects of fiscal policy. On the other hand, they presumably understand the direct implications
for their current and future after-tax incomes. Therefore we follow the approach of Evans et al. (2009)
and assume that agents understand the future path of taxes and other fiscal instruments implied by the
government financing structure, while using infinite-horizon learning to forecast other variables.
This paper extends the existing literature by assessing the role of this learning set-up for the effects
of government spending shocks in a new Keynesian DSGE model. The key result is that the multiplier
under learning is about twice as large as under rational expectations. Hence, this paper provides a the-
oretical argument for the large multipliers in the recent empirical literature. Moreover, in contrast to the
dynamics under rational expectations, government spending crowds in private consumption when agents
engage in learning behaviour. The intuition for this result is that, in the learning model, households’
incomplete structural knowledge results in excessive optimism or pessimism regarding the general equi-
librium effects of future government spending. In particular, agents are more optimistic about future
wages and more pessimistic about future interest rates than under rational expectations which leads to a
positive effect on current consumption.
The analysis confirms the importance of price rigidity and the complementarity between labour and
consumption for explaining the positive consumption response, as emphasized by Bilbiie (2011) and
Christiano et al. (2011), for example. However, under rational expectations these features alone are not
sufficient for government spending to crowd in private consumption in our model. Only under adaptive
learning does consumption rise after the fiscal shock, resulting in a multiplier greater than one, even if
price rigidity is limited and the degree of consumption-labour complementarity is small. Another result
is that learning is crucial for generating a positive co-movement between hours worked and real wages
after a government spending shock.
This paper also considers different fiscal financing strategies in an extended version of the model with
distortionary taxes. Not surprisingly, the government spending multipliers are substantially smaller, or
even negative, when government spending is financed through capital or labour income taxes. However,
the output and consumption multipliers under learning are always larger than under rational expectations,
irrespective of the financing strategy.
The work presented here is related to several other papers that build on the learning set-up of Evans
et al. (2009). All these contributions emphasize the substantial differences between the responses to fiscal
policy changes under learning and under rational expectations. Mitra et al. (2013) consider permanent
policy changes in a real business cycle (RBC) model where agents also have to estimate the new steady
state values. The authors show that under learning oscillatory dynamics can emerge and that the effects
under learning depend on the specific form of the policy change. Recently, Mitra et al. (2016) have
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analysed the effects of a surprise two-year increase in government spending. An interesting result is that
their learning model can generate a hump-shaped response in consumption. Gasteiger and Zhang (2014)
study the impact of fiscal policy in a deterministic version of the RBC model with distortionary taxation.
This paper generalizes the analysis of the cited works by examining the dynamics in a new Keyne-
sian DSGE model with commonly used model features such as imperfect competition, price rigidity,
and capital adjustment costs. The paper shows that these model features crucially affect the impact of
adaptive learning on the dynamics of a government spending shock, in particular when it comes to the
degree of price rigidity. The importance of these features is also emphasized in a recent contribution by
Evans et al. (2016). The authors examine the possibility of stagnation in a new Keynesian model when
the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is binding. They show that, under learning, pessimistic
expectations can push the economy into recession. The results presented here, apply to “normal times”
where the central bank maintains a standard Taylor rule.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the DSGE model that will be
used throughout the paper. Section 3 defines the rational expectations quilibrium. The adaptive learning
mechanism is set out in Section 4. In Section 5, the effects of a temporary increase in government
spending in the learning model are compared with the effects under rational expectations. A distinction
is made between a neoclassical specification with fully flexible prices and a new Keynesian specification
of the model. The role of learning for the government spending multipliers is discussed in Section 6. As
an extension, Section 7 adds a richer specification of fiscal policy to the baseline model and discusses
the role of different financing strategies. The last section concludes.
2 The Model economy
This section briefly describes the new Keynesian DSGE model that we will use in this paper. The
model is based on the standard sticky-price framework analysed, for instance, in Woodford (2003) and
Christiano et al. (2011). More elaborate specifications can be found in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007)
and Christiano et al. (2005).
The economy is populated by a representative household, a perfectly competitive final goods pro-
ducer, a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers, a central bank, and a
fiscal authority.1
Household The representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility. Preferences are defined













with β ∈ (0,1), σ > 0, σ 6= 1, and φ ∈ (0,1).2 Here E∗t (·) denotes the subjective expectations of the
household at time t. We consider King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) preferences, which is standard in
business cycle analysis. If σ > 1 consumption and labour are complements, which is an important model
1Appendix A contains the derivations of the model equations.
2Money is not included explicitly in the analysis. A cashless limit economy is assumed. See Woodford (2003) for a detailed
discussion of this approach.
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feature for the analysis in the subsequent sections.
The household’s flow budget constraint is given by
Ct + It +Bt+1 ≤WtNt + rkt Kt +Rt−1Π−1t Bt +Dt −Tt , (2)
where It , Wt , rkt , Dt , and Tt denote period t gross investment, real wage rate, real rental rate of capital,
dividends from intermediate firms, and lump-sum taxes, respectively. In addition, the variable Bt repres-
ents the quantity of one-period bonds carried over from period t−1. The variable Rt−1 denotes the gross
nominal interest rate on bonds purchased in period t − 1, and Πt denotes the gross inflation rate. The
stock of physical capital, Kt , is owned by the household and accumulates according to









were δ denotes the physical rate of depreciation, and ςI > 0 is the Lucas and Prescott (1971) capital
adjustment cost parameter.
As shown in Appendix C.1, log-linearising the equilibrium conditions and substituting the consump-
tion Euler equation into the household’s inter-temporal budget constraint yields the following consump-
tion function:3




t − SGet , (4)
where





































jE∗t Ĝt+ j, (10)
under the assumption that the transversality condition
lim
j→+∞
Rt,t+ j−1E∗t Bt+ j = 0, (11)
3Throughout the paper, hatted variables denote log-deviations from the steady state. Barred variables refer to steady state
values.
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, holds.4 The coefficients Γ1, Γ2, Γ3, and Γ4 are given in
Appendix C.1.
Equation (4) implies that the household’s choice of current consumption depends on subjective ex-
pectations of future factor prices, interest rates, inflation rates, dividends, and government expenditures.
It is assumed that expectations are formed at time t.
Optimal investment requires that
Q̂t = βE∗t Q̂t+1− R̂t +E∗t Π̂t+1 +β r̄kE∗t r̂kt+1, (12)
where Qt denotes Tobin’s Q, the shadow value of existing capital.5 Forward iteration gives the following










t+ j−E∗t R̂t+ j +β−1E∗t Π̂t+ j
]
. (13)
Firms A representative, perfectly competitive firm bundles a continuum of intermediate goods into a










where ε > 1, and Yt(i) is the input of intermediate good i ∈ [0,1]. The firm chooses the quantities of
inputs so as to maximize its profit, taking as given the final goods price Pt and the intermediate goods







There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers populating the
unit interval. Facing the real factor prices Wt and rkt , and the demand function (15), a typical intermediate
goods firm i ∈ [0,1] rents labour, Nt(i), and capital, Kt(i), in order to minimize costs. Its production
function is given by
Yt(i) = ZtKt(i)αNt(i)1−α , (16)














with ρZ ∈ (0,1).
Following Calvo (1983), intermediate goods producers set nominal prices in a staggered fashion.
Each period an intermediate goods producer can adjust its price with a constant probability 1−θ . A firm
i that is permitted to adjust prices in period t, will choose a new optimal price, P∗t (i), to maximize the
4Evans et al. (2012) provide a detailed analysis of the role of this condition for the validity of the Ricardian equivalence
proposition.
5Tobin’s Q is defined as Qt ≡ qt/λt , where qt is the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the capital accumulation rule and
λt the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the household’s budget constraint in the household’s optimization problem. See
Appendix A for the derivations.
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Yt+ j(i)−MCt+ jYt+ j(i)
}
, (18)
where UC,t+ j is the j-period ahead marginal utility of consumption. At the end of each period, the
intermediate firm distributes its profits as a real dividend, Dt(i), to the representative household.















(βθ) j E∗t Π̂t+ j+1, (19)
with ϕ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ).6
Government Policies The fiscal authority finances expenditure through lump-sum taxes and bond
sales. The government budget constraint is given by
Tt +Bt+1 = Gt +Rt−1Π−1t Bt . (20)









)ρR exp(εRt ), εRt ∼N (0,σ2R), and ρR ∈ (0,1). It is assumed that the Taylor principle
holds, i.e. ρΠ > 1.
Market Clearing Market clearing in the goods market and the markets of production factors requires
that the following conditions are met:









Linear Approximation The remainder of the paper considers the log-linear approximation of the
model about its steady state. The equilibrium conditions of the linearised model are given in Appendix
B.
6The results in this paper are independent of whether the forecasts of the technology shock E∗t Ẑt+ j are determined by
adaptive learning or by the shock process (17).
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3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We begin with the standard case of rational expectations as a benchmark to compare against the adaptive
learning model. In the rational expectations case, agents have full knowledge of the structure of the
economy and the underlying equilibrium, and use this knowledge to forecast future variables. In the
absence of a policy change, the rational expectations equilibrium of the linearised model can be written







where yt is the vector of log-linearised endogenous variables of the model.7
4 Adaptive learning
We now go beyond the rational expectations hypothesis and assume agents combine limited structural
knowledge with adaptive learning to forecast future variables. In particular, agents understand the struc-
ture of government financing and use the government budget constraint (20) and the announced future
change in government spending to forecast future taxes. In forecasting other variables they rely on fore-
casting models estimated using least-squares learning.
As argued by Evans et al. (2009) this set-up is a natural way to proceed. When it comes to the general
equilibrium effects of fiscal policy, it is hard to believe that households and firms have perfect knowledge
on how fiscal policy shocks affect future aggregate variables. On the other hand, agents presumably
understand the direct implications of higher future taxes for their future disposable incomes.
This approach implies that E∗t Ĝt+ j = Gt+ j in the consumption function (4), since households know
the future path of government spending and understand the direct effect of this path on their future
disposable incomes. Forecasts on wages E∗t Ŵt+ j, interest rates E
∗
t R̂t+ j, inflation rates E
∗
t Π̂t+ j, rental
rates of capital E∗t r̂
k
t+ j, and dividends E
∗
t D̂t+ j, appearing in the conditions (4), (13), and (19), however,
depend on the perceived laws of motion (PLMs) held by the agents, with coefficients updated over time
using recursive least squares.8 Following Mitra et al. (2013, 2016), it is assumed that the form of these


































7The 13 endogenous log-linearized variables of the baseline new Keynesian model are private consumption (Ĉt ), dividends
(D̂t ), investment (Ît ), capital (K̂t ), marginal cost (M̂Ct ), labour (N̂t ), inflation (Π̂t ), Tobin’s Q (Q̂t ), nominal interest rate (R̂t ),
rental rate of capital (r̂kt ), lump-sum taxes (T̂t ), wage rate (Ŵt ), and output (Ŷt ).
8Following the infinite-horizon learning approach, it is assumed that agents make forecasts infinitely many periods ahead.
By contrast, the Euler equation learning approach assumes that agents make one-step ahead forecasts which are typically
present in Euler equations. For a discussion of the two approaches see Honkapohja et al. (2013). An earlier version of this
paper considered Euler equation learning in a model where agents did not incorporate the future path of government spending
into their behavioural rules. The results of this approach, which are available upon request, are very similar to those presented
here.
9As is standard in the learning literature, it is assumed that the agents know the parameters of the observed exogenous
processes.
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Equation (26) can be iterated forward to obtain the forecasts E∗t y
f
t+ j for j = 2, 3, . . ., which in turn
are used to express the sums of future expected terms in (4), (13), and (19) as linear functions of Ẑt and
K̂t+1. These expressions, together with the other equilibrium conditions (cf. Appendix B), define the
temporary equilibrium at time t given the coefficients ψt , the predetermined variables B̂t , K̂t , and R̂t−1,
current government spending Ĝt , and the exogenous shocks ûRt and Ẑt . Note that agents have access to Ẑt
and K̂t+1 when making their forecasts at time t. This means that the equilibrium values of the endogenous
variables and the agents’ forecasts are simultaneously determined. See Appendix C.1 for further details.
Agents estimate the coefficients ψt using a constant-gain variant of Recursive Least Squares:
















is the data vector used to estimate the beliefs, St is the moment matrix for Xt ,
and γ > 0 is the gain parameter. The learning rule (27) specifies the evolution of the belief parameters
over time. Taken together with the temporary equilibrium equations, it determines the dynamics under
learning.
Because the gain parameter is assumed to be a positive constant, the learning algorithm weighs
recent data more heavily. Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2007) refer to this approach as “perpetual
learning” because agents forget past data over time and hence learn permanently. For this reason, this
procedure is more robust to structural change such as changes in fiscal policy. Moreover, several studies,
such as Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p. 49), show how a constant-
gain learning rule can replicate the phenomenon of excess volatility. The constant-gain recursive least
squares algorithm is therefore widely used in the adaptive learning literature (see Eusepi and Preston,
2011; Milani, 2007; Slobodyan and Wouters, 2012, for example).
Using the terminology of Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Chapter 13) the PLMs (26) are “restricted”
or “underparameterised” because they do not include Ĝt and ûRt . Adding the monetary policy shock û
R
t
does not alter the results of the paper. The exclusion of government spending Ĝt reflects the assumption
that agents have imperfect knowledge on the general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy. If this variable
were added to the PLMs, the impulse response functions under learning presented in this paper would
coincide with those under rational expectations.
The restricted forecast rule (26) cannot converge to the rational expectations equilibrium, because
it is not in the same space. However, it can converge to a distribution centred around the so-called
restricted perceptions equilibrium (RPE). In this equilibrium the agents’ forecasts are optimal relative
to the restricted information set. That is, although agents use an underparameterised forecasting model,
their forecast errors are uncorrelated with the (restricted) information set Xt used in the expectation
formation. Guse (2008) provides a general technique to project the actual law of motion into the same
class as the underparameterised forecasting model. The technique defines a projected T -map which maps
the restricted forecast rule to the projected actual law of motion. The RPE can be found as a fixed point
of this map. In the next section, the initial coefficients of the forecast rule, ψ0, are pinned down to the
RPE-implied coefficients. Note, however, that – in contrast to a decreasing-gain algorithm – the constant-
gain algorithm employed here cannot converge to the coefficients ψ0, but rather to a distribution centred
around those values. An interesting implication is that the impact responses to a government spending
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shock will fluctuate around those presented here owing to fluctuations in the estimated coefficients ψt
of the forecast rule – this topic is left to future research. In this paper, we restrict our attention to the
impulse responses for the RPE coefficients ψ0.10
5 The role of expectations for the effects of government spending shocks
This section examines the effects of a temporary increase in government spending under different as-
sumptions with respect to agents’ expectations. In particular, the macroeconomic effects of the shock
under rational expectations are compared with those under adaptive learning. Because the role of price
rigidity is of crucial importance, the new Keynesian model is examined in comparison with a neoclassical
specification of the model where prices are fully flexible.
5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to quarterly periods. The parameters receive the values presented in Table 1.
Most parameters are set to values that are typical in the business cycle literature. The elasticity of output
with respect to capital, α , is fixed to 1/3. The subjective discount factor, β , is calibrated to match an
annualized steady state real interest rate of 4.0%. The value of δ is 0.025 so that the depreciation rate
of capital is 2.5% per quarter. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ε , is such that
the mark-up of price over marginal cost is equal to 20% in steady state. The Calvo parameter, θ , is
0.75, implying an average frequency of price reoptimization of 4 quarters. The Taylor rule coefficient on
inflation, ρΠ, is 1.5, a standard value in the literature. The AR(1) coefficient of technology, ρZ , receives a
value of 0.90. The coefficient of risk aversion, σ , is set to 2.0. This value is roughly in the middle of the
range of the empirical estimates and consistent with the estimates obtained by Basu and Kimball (2002).
Following Christiano et al. (2011), the capital adjustment cost parameter, ςI , is equal to 17. The share
of government expenditure in GDP, Ḡ/Ȳ , is set at 0.20 to match the postwar U.S. government spending
share. For the ratio B̄/Ȳ the average general government gross financial liabilities for the U.S. provided
in the OECD (2014b) database over the period 2000–2013 are used. The preference parameter φ is
calibrated such that the share of time devoted to work in the steady state is fixed to 1/3. As a benchmark,
the gain parameter, γ , is set to 0.02, which is a value well within the range of estimates reported in the
literature. However, the particular value of the gain parameter is not crucial for our impulse response
analysis.11 All error terms are assumed to have a standard deviation of 0.05. For simplicity, the AR(1)
coefficient of the nominal interest rate, ρR, is assumed to be zero.
Table 2 shows the model values of some important macroeconomic aggregates. The calibration
produces shares of private consumption and investment in GDP close to those observed in most industri-
alized countries. The steady-state labour’s share of total income is 0.56, a value roughly consistent with
the observed U.S. labour income share.12
10The parameterisation considered guarantees a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium. As noted by Guse (2008)
there is no general method to determine uniqueness of the restricted perceptions equilibrium. This is a topic for future research.
11Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2007) found that a gain parameter in the range 0.01–0.04 provides the best fit between
the agents’ forecasts in the model and the expectations data from the Survey of Forecasters. Using a similar strategy, Branch
and Evans (2006) obtain a value of 0.0345. The estimate of Milani (2007) equals 0.0183 and hence lies within the same range.
However, the estimated gain of 0.0029 in Eusepi and Preston (2011) is much smaller. The estimation results from Slobodyan
and Wouters (2012) provide values for γ going from 0.001 to 0.06 depending on the particular learning scheme. Within the
range of values mentioned here, the effect of a different value for the gain parameter is negligible.
12The U.S. labour income share in the industrial sector over the period 2000-2010 was on average 57% (OECD, 2014b).
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Parameter Description Value
α Output elasticity with respect to capital 1/3
β Households subjective discount factor 1.04−0.25
γ Gain parameter 0.02
δ Rate of physical capital depreciation 0.025
ε Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 6.0
θ Degree of nominal price rigidity 0.75
ρΠ Taylor rule inflation rate coefficient 1.5
ρR Interest rate AR(1) coefficient 0.00
ρZ Technology shock AR(1) coefficient 0.90
σ Coefficient of risk aversion 2.0
σR Standard deviation of the interest rate disturbance εR 0.05
σZ Standard deviation of the technology disturbance εZ 0.05
ςI Capital adjustment cost parameter 17
φ Preference parameter 0.35
B̄/Ȳ Steady state government debt to output ratio 0.74
Ḡ/Ȳ Steady state government expenditure to output ratio 0.20
Table 1: Model parameters.
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5.2 Impulse responses after a government spending shock
We now turn to the impulse responses of economic variables following a temporary increase in gov-
ernment spending of 1% of GDP at the beginning of period t = 1 that is financed through an increase
in lump-sum taxes. After the shock, government spending gradually converges back to its steady-state
value according to the following autoregressive process:
Ĝt = ρGĜt−1, t > 1, (28)






In this section, it is assumed that real public debt remains constant and lump-sum taxes adjust to maintain
budget balance in each period. Financing with distortionary taxation and government bonds is discussed
in the next section.
Neoclassical specification Figure 1 shows the responses to the government spending shock when
prices are fully flexible (θ → 0.00). The solid and dotted lines depict the impulse responses under
rational expectations and adaptive learning, respectively.13
Under rational expectations the effects of fiscal policy in a neoclassical model are well-understood
– see for instance Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1993). The wealth and inter-temporal
substitution effects triggered by a temporary increase in government spending lead to a reduction in con-
sumption and leisure on impact. Intuitively, agents adjust their consumption and labour supply because
higher future taxes reduce their overall wealth. At the same time, the government absorption of resources
reduces private investment. The increase in labour supply and the drop in investment imply a decline in
the capital-labour ratio, resulting in a fall in the wage Wt and a rise in the rental rate of capital rkt and
the interest rate Rt . The high (but declining) real interest rate leads to a rising path of consumption.
The increase in the real interest rate is also a source of the declining path of labour supply through an
inter-temporal substitution effect: it pays to work harder in periods when the interest rate is high and
to use part of the earnings to build up the capital stock. Along the transition path, private consumption
and employment gradually return to the original steady state; the capital-labour ratio converges to its
steady-state value as investment recovers and both Wt and rkt return to their steady-state values.
Under learning, consumption falls less than under rational expectations. The reason is that agents
anticipate the increase in future taxes, but fail to correctly foresee the paths of lower future wages and
higher future interest rates. Agents are too optimistic about future wages and underestimate the rise in
interest rates that will result from the policy change. More generally, the responses of expected future
interest rates, factor prices, and dividends to the fiscal shock are only limited because these expectations
are determined by adaptive learning and only gradually adjust to the observed fall in the capital stock.
Those expectations determine the household’s consumption choice, as they appear in the expectational




t , and SDet in the consumption function (4). The mechanism is as follows. In period
t = 1 expected wages (SW et ) are higher and expected interest rates (SR
e
t ) are lower under learning than
13The impulse responses of all variables in the model and the expectations on all forward-looking variables are included in
Appendix D.
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Rational Expectations Adaptive Learning
Figure 1: Impulse responses to an increase in government spending of 1% of GDP in the neoclassical
specification of the model. The impulse response functions are measured in percentage deviations from
steady-state. The horizontal axis measures quarters.
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under rational expectations. That is why the fall in consumption is smaller, even though expected future
rental rates (Srk,et ) and dividends (SDet ) are lower than under rational expectations. Because consumption
falls less, labour supply will also rise less. The smaller drop in consumption induces a smaller rise
in the marginal utility of consumption, which is a key element in the agents’ intra-temporal optimality
between labour and leisure. The utility gain of a marginal increase in labour supply will be smaller.
Moreover, since under learning the drop in disposable income is associated with a smaller decrease in
consumption, the representative household must dissave more and, as a consequence, investment declines
more sharply. This leads to a larger increase in the interest rate. In the aggregate, the net impact of a
government spending shock on output is slightly smaller under adaptive learning than under rational
expectations. In the periods following the shock, agents’ forecasts adjust in response to the observed fall
in the capital stock. The lower capital stock leads to lower forecasts of future wages and dividends, on
the one hand, and higher forecasts of future interest rates and rental rates of capital on the other. In later
periods, as the capital stock reverts back to normal, all expectations converge to the steady state.
New Keynesian specification Figure 2 depicts the impulse responses after a government spending
shock in the economy where prices are rigid. When agents have rational expectations, the effects of a
fiscal expansion are similar to those under fully flexible prices. Quantitatively, however, the effect on
hours worked is stronger because the rise in labour supply is accompanied by an outward shift in labour
demand. As set forth by Linnemann and Schabert (2003), Perotti (2008) and others, nominal rigidities
generate a fall in the mark-up when the government boosts aggregate demand. This induces a rise in
labour demand, which amplifies the increase in employment and reduces the fall in the real wage rate.
When agents form expectations using an adaptive learning mechanism, the effects of a government
spending shock change substantially, especially with respect to the response of private consumption
and real wages. In contrast to the neoclassical specification, government spending crowds in private
consumption. This finding is particularly interesting since it is in accordance with the empirical evidence
found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Fragetta and Gasteiger (2014), Galí
et al. (2007), and Perotti (2008), for example.
The main mechanisms that generate a rise in consumption can be described as follows. Under learn-
ing, lower expected future real interest rates weaken the incentive to postpone consumption. Moreover,
over-optimism concerning future wages dampens the conventional negative wealth effect of the fiscal ex-
pansion on current consumption. These weaker negative wealth and substitution effects on consumption
in period t = 1 also lead to a smaller increase in labour supply on impact which, together with the higher
demand for labour, permits the real wage to rise. Consequently, agents experience a positive substitution
effect from leisure into labour and consumption and overcome the negative wealth effect of the fiscal
shock. In the periods following the shock the expectations E∗t Ŵt+ j, E
∗
t R̂t+ j, E
∗







gradually respond to the data. Eventually, as explained in the above discussion of the neoclassical case,
all expectations return to their steady state values.
Comparing the neoclassical and the new Keynesian specifications of the learning model, it is apparent
that price rigidity is crucial for generating crowding in of private consumption. In particular, as argued by
Bilbiie (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011), staggered price setting by monopolistically competitive firms
and complementarity between consumption and labour provides a channel by which private consumption
can react positively to a government spending shock. If prices are sticky, a government spending shock
induces an outward shift in the demand for labour, strengthening the rise in employment. Because
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to an increase in government spending of 1% of GDP in the new Keynesian
model. The impulse response functions are measured in percentage deviations from steady-state. The
horizontal axis measures quarters.
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Rational Expectations Adaptive Learning
Figure 3: Impulse responses to an increase in government spending of 1% of GDP for different degrees
of non-separability (σ ) in the new Keynesian model. The impulse response functions are measured in
percentage deviations from steady-state. The x-axis measures quarters.
consumption and labour are complements, i.e. σ > 1, this increase in employment raises the marginal
utility of consumption. Under learning, this channel is strong enough for private consumption to crowd
in after the government spending shock, whereas under rational expectations it is not.
Given our preference specification, higher values of σ imply stronger complementarity between
consumption and labour. At the same time, a higher value of σ , i.e. a lower inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution, makes households less willing to postpone consumption in response to the expected
real interest rate. Thus, the response of consumption is stronger, the larger the value of σ .14 Figure
3 illustrates this result. The figure shows the impulse responses of private consumption and output
for different values of σ . The grey (light) shaded area in the right-hand plot shows that when economic
agents have rational expectations, the impact of government spending on private consumption is negative
for all considered values of σ . This is in sharp contrast with the impulse responses of the adaptive
learning model depicted by the blue (dark) shaded area. It is clear that under the learning mechanism,
the crowding in effect on consumption occurs for every σ > 1. However, in the limit case of σ = 1, when
preferences are separable over leisure and consumption, this effect does not occur.
Another notable observation is the positive response of real wages under learning. Only when agents
use the adaptive learning mechanism, the increase in aggregate hours after a positive government spend-
ing shock coexists with an increase in real wages. That is because the learning behaviour reduces the
labour supply effect of the government spending shock, while price rigidity leads to a rise in labour de-
mand. Considering this, the adaptive learning mechanism brings the theoretical impulse responses again
14This result is particularly interesting given the discussion in the literature on preference-based explanations for government
spending crowding in private consumption and the positive co-movement of consumption and hours worked. Linnemann (2006)
argues that a certain type of non separable utility, where labour and consumption are complements, can generate these results in
a standard real business cycle model. However, Bilbiie (2009, 2011) points out that the preferences considered by Linnemann
rely on a downward-sloping labour supply schedule. By contrast, a standard King et al. (1988) utility specification is considered
here and we find that in the adaptive learning model government spending crowds in private consumption even if the degree of
complementarity, σ , is small.
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into line with those observed empirically. Evidence on the positive co-movement between real wages and
hours worked after a government spending shock can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Galí
et al. (2007), and Fatás and Mihov (2001), for example. However, the empirical evidence is not entirely
unambiguous (see, for instance, Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Perotti (2008)). Another difference with
the neoclassical specification, is the dampening effect of learning on the fall in investment.
6 The government spending multiplier
We now turn to the analysis of the government spending multiplier in the new Keynesian model. The
question of the size of the government spending multiplier has been addressed by many authors in the
literature. In a comprehensive review of the literature, Ramey (2011) concludes that the range of estim-
ates of the output multiplier is probably between 0.8 and 1.5. Furthermore, as noted above, a number of
empirical studies find that the consumption multiplier is positive. Replicating these empirical findings
represents an important challenge for most theoretical rational expectations models. In response to this,
several authors have proposed different mechanisms such as alternative preference specifications (Lin-
nemann, 2006), the existence of rule-of-thumb consumers (Galí et al., 2007), different kinds of rigidities,
and the stance of monetary policy (Coenen et al., 2012; Leeper et al., 2015).
Against that background, the discussion in the previous section shows that expectation formation too
is a key factor for the impact of fiscal policy. Adaptive learning can amplify this impact substantially,
even in the absence of accommodative monetary policy. As explained in the previous section, because
under learning agents underestimate the general equilibrium effects of tax-financed government spending
expansion in their expectation formation, private consumption can respond positively and in this way
amplify the response of aggregate economic activity.
Table 3 illustrates this result. It reports the present-value government spending multipliers for output,
consumption, and investment in the rational expectations model and the adaptive learning model. Fol-















where Xt is the response of variable X in period t, Gt is government spending in period t, R̄ is the steady
state gross nominal interest rate, and Ḡ/X̄ is the steady state government expenditure to X ratio.
Table 3 shows that the present-value multipliers for output are significantly bigger under learning than
under rational expectations, also at longer horizons. Thus, the learning model is capable of generating
multipliers that are well within the range of empirical estimates reviewed by Ramey (2011). Moreover,
the short- and longer-term consumption multiplier is always positive under learning, whereas it is always
negative under rational expectations. An important result is that it is possible to achieve this outcome even
if the degree of complementarity between labour and consumption in the utility function is weak, whereas
in a model with rational expectations it is often necessary to assume high values for this parameter (see
Linnemann, 2006; Bilbiie, 2009, 2011, for example).
In addition, adaptive learning provides a theoretical mechanism for generating government spending
multipliers bigger than one, even if price stickiness is relatively small. This is particularly relevant since
the discussion in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) points out that the extent of price rigidity is often over-
estimated. Figure 4 reports the multipliers for output, consumption, and investment for different degrees
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Rational expectations Adaptive learning
Impact 1 year 4 years 6 years Impact 1 year 4 years 6 years
PV (∆Y )
PV (∆G) 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.43 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.97
PV (∆C)
PV (∆G) −0.29 −0.30 −0.34 −0.37 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06
PV (∆I)
PV (∆G) −0.20 −0.20 −0.20 −0.20 −0.08 −0.08 −0.09 −0.09
Table 3: Present-value multipliers in the new Keynesian model under rational expectations and under
adaptive learning.
of price rigidity θ . Moreover, the figure allows to compare the multipliers under rational expectations
with those under adaptive learning. As noted earlier, throughout this analysis the central bank maintains
a standard Taylor rule. The figure shows that for the benchmark case with θ = 0.75, the output multiplier
under learning is bigger than one and about twice as large as the multiplier under rational expectations.
The consumption multiplier is increasing with the degree of price rigidity. As noted earlier, it is
optimal for an intermediate firm that cannot change its price, to hire more labour when the demand for
its intermediate good increases. This amplifies the rise in employment after a government spending
increase, and encourages the household to consume more when preferences are non-separable. Figure 4
shows that government spending crowds in private consumption when prices are sufficiently rigid. For
example, if θ = 0.75 the consumption multiplier equals 0.09. Moreover, notice that the crowding out
of investment becomes smaller as prices become more sticky. Nevertheless, the investment multiplier
always remains negative.
7 Alternative specification of fiscal policy
In the baseline impulse response analysis, the increase in government spending was financed through an
increase in lump-sum taxes. This makes the results comparable with the policy experiments typically
considered in the literature. As an extension, this section considers a richer specification of fiscal policy
in which the fiscal authority finances expenditure, interest payments, and lump-sum transfers through the
emission of one-period debt and through taxation on private consumption and capital and labour income.
The government budget constraint is now given by
Bt+1 + τct Ct + τ
w




t Kt = Gt +Rt−1Π
−1
t Bt +T Rt , (31)
where τct , τ
w
t , and τ
k
t are the tax rates on private consumption, labour income, and capital income, re-
spectively, and T Rt are lump-sum transfers.15
The steady state tax rates are set equal to U.S. averages over the period 2000–2013: τ̄c = 0.01,
τ̄w = 0.39, and τ̄k = 0.39. The consumption tax rate is calculated as in Appendix B of Leeper et al.
(2010). The labour income tax rate and the corporate income tax rate are retrieved from the OECD
(2014c) and OECD (2014a) databases.16
15In contrast to the baseline model, a lump-sum transfer T Rt is considered instead of a lump-sum tax Tt , but this is just
a matter of definition since Tt = −T Rt . It is more natural to proceed in this way since, with this alternative fiscal policy
specification, the parameterisation of the model implies a negative lump-sum tax.
16The labour income tax is the combined central and sub-central government income tax rate plus employee social security
contribution, as a percentage of average gross wage earnings. The capital income tax rate is the basic combined central and
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Figure 4: Impact multipliers for different degrees of price rigidity in the rational expectations model and
the adaptive learning model.
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The rich specification of fiscal policy allows us to compare government spending multipliers for dif-
ferent fiscal financing strategies. Table 4 includes the results for three strategies in the new Keynesian
model. “Strategy 1” corresponds to the baseline analysis of a government spending increase financed
through lump-sum taxation. In “Strategy 2” the spending increase is associated with a rise in the cap-
ital income tax. In particular, the government raises the tax rate on capital such that in each period the
spending increase is matched by an equal increase in steady-state tax revenues from capital. In the same
manner, “Strategy 3” corresponds to an increase in the labour income tax. For the sake of consistency
with the approach adopted in the previous sections, real public debt remains constant throughout all sim-
ulations and lump-sum transfers adjust to ensure that the period-by-period government budget constraint
(31) is satisfied. Note, however, that the results are identical if we instead allow for debt financing. As
shown in Appendix C.2, the particular paths of debt and lump-sum transfers are irrelevant for the equi-
librium allocation.17 This is a generalisation of the Ricardian equivalence result of Evans et al. (2012).
The derivation of the equations governing the dynamics under learning is detailed in Appendix C.2.
Table 4 shows that the effects of a government spending shock depend quite dramatically on the fiscal
financing strategy. First, consider the multipliers when the rise in government spending is associated with
an increase in the capital tax rate (Strategy 2). With capital taxes temporarily higher, agents with rational
expectations want to reduce investment and consume more. Therefore, investment declines more strongly
than under lump-sum financing and the short-term consumption multipliers under rational expectations
are less negative. The adverse effects on the capital stock suppress the multipliers in the medium and
long run. In the learning model, the output multiplier at impact is less than half of the multiplier under
lump-sum financing. The consumption multiplier under learning is now slightly negative at impact and
reaches a value of −0.37 after six years.
The most striking difference between rational expectations and learning occurs in the presence of
labour income tax financing (Strategy 3). Under rational expectations, the output multiplier is negative
at every horizon. Labour supply falls considerably at impact as the temporary increase in the labour
income tax rate generates a strong incentive to postpone work to periods with lower tax rates. This inter-
temporal substitution effect dominates the wealth effect on labour supply and the rise in labour demand
associated with the rise in government spending. Now the consumption-labour complementarity works in
the opposite direction as before: the sharp drop in employment lowers the marginal utility of consumption
significantly, resulting in deeply negative consumption multipliers. The same mechanism is at play in
the learning model, but the drop in consumption is much weaker. As in the model without distortionary
taxes, agents underestimate the general equilibrium effects of the policy change, in particular those on
future real interest rates. This results in a smaller decline in consumption in period t = 1 and weakens the
negative contemporaneous effect of low consumption on labour supply caused by consumption-labour
complementarity. In fact, under learning employment rises after the policy shock. As a consequence,
learning completely reverses the sign of the output multipliers. Under rational expectations, the impact
multiplier is negative and equals −0.64, whereas under learning it is positive and equal to 0.48. The
impulse responses for the different financing strategies are depicted in Figure 5 of the Appendix.
sub-central (statutory) corporate income tax rate given by the adjusted central government rate plus the sub-central rate. Both
tax rates are marginal rates. See OECD (2014c) and OECD (2014a) for explanatory notes.
17Alternatively, one could assume that debt adjusts to satisfy the government budget constraint (31) in each period and lump-
sum transfers stabilise debt according to ˆT Rt = −ρT RB̂t , with ρT R > 0. The results under this approach are identical to those
reported in the paper, except for the dynamics of lump-sum transfers and debt, of course. A sufficiently large ρT R ensures a
stable path of government debt.
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Rational expectations Adaptive learning
Impact 1 year 4 years 6 years Impact 1 year 4 years 6 years
Strategy 1: lump-sum financing (baseline model)
PV (∆Y )
PV (∆G) 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.43 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.97
PV (∆C)
PV (∆G) −0.29 −0.30 −0.34 −0.37 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06
PV (∆I)
PV (∆G) −0.20 −0.20 −0.20 −0.20 −0.08 −0.08 −0.09 −0.09
Strategy 2: capital tax financing
PV (∆Y )
PV (∆G) 0.32 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.43 0.38 0.20 0.08
PV (∆C)
PV (∆G) −0.23 −0.26 −0.40 −0.48 −0.08 −0.12 −0.27 −0.37
PV (∆I)
PV (∆G) −0.68 −0.69 −0.70 −0.71 −0.80 −0.80 −0.81 −0.82
Strategy 3: labour tax financing
PV (∆Y )
PV (∆G) −0.64 −0.68 −0.85 −0.95 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.40
PV (∆C)
PV (∆G) −1.07 −1.10 −1.24 −1.33 −0.37 −0.38 −0.41 −0.43
PV (∆I)
PV (∆G) −0.71 −0.71 −0.73 −0.74 −0.17 −0.18 −0.18 −0.18
Table 4: Present-value multipliers for different specifications of fiscal policy in the new Keynesian model
with rational expectations and with adaptive learning. See main text for a description of the different
financing strategies.
8 Conclusion
This paper assesses the role of expectations for the macroeconomic dynamics of a government spending
shock and, in particular, for the size of the government spending multiplier. There is no doubt that it is
implausible to assume that agents have complete knowledge of the structure of the economy. Therefore,
this paper considers a model where agents understand the direct wealth effects from the change in gov-
ernment spending and taxes, but fail to fully foresee the general equilibrium effects on factor prices and
other aggregate variables. To forecast these variables they rely on small forecasting models estimated
using least-squares learning. The impulse responses under this type of learning show that the effects of
expansionary fiscal policy crucially depend on the agents’ beliefs about the future.
Expectations significantly influence the size of the short- and longer-term multipliers of output,
private consumption, and investment. The new Keynesian adaptive learning model generates an output
multiplier at impact of 1.01, a value that is about twice as large as the multiplier under rational expect-
ations. Expectations of future real interest rates are crucial for understanding this result. Under rational
expectations, the inter-temporal substitution effect of higher future interest rates causes consumption to
fall. Under learning, however, agents underestimate the increase in future interest rates and consump-
tion rises at impact. Additionally, the learning mechanism induces a positive co-movement between
real wages and hours worked after a government spending shock in the new Keynesian model. Also
the investment multiplier for this model is larger than for the rational expectations model, but remains
negative.
This paper confirms the findings of Bilbiie (2011), Christiano et al. (2011), and others, that emphasize
the importance of sticky prices and consumption-labour complementarity for government spending to
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crowd in private consumption. However, in the parameterisation considered, these model features alone
are not sufficient to generate a rise in consumption. Only in the learning model, government spending
crowds in private consumption. Hence, this paper provides a new explanation for a positive consumption
response to a temporary government spending increase.
Finally, the learning perspective provides new insights on the desirability of different fiscal finan-
cing strategies. For policy makers who seek to stimulate aggregate demand, the results demonstrate that
lump-sum financing is preferred over capital or labour tax financing, both under learning and under ra-
tional expectations. However, adaptive learning significantly alters the effects of a government spending
shock when financed by distortionary taxes. Unlike in the rational expectations model, the government
spending multipliers for output are still positive with labour tax financing.
References
Aiyagari, S. R., Christiano, L. J., and Eichenbaum, M. S. (1992). The output, employment, and interest
rate effects of government consumption. Journal of Monetary Economics, 30(1):73 – 86.
Basu, S. and Kimball, M. S. (2002). Long-run labor supply and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
for consumption. Mimeo, University of Michigan and NBER.
Baxter, M. and King, R. G. (1993). Fiscal policy in general equilibrium. American Economic Review,
83(3):315–34.
Bilbiie, F. O. (2009). Nonseparable preferences, fiscal policy puzzles, and inferior goods. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 41(2-3):443–450.
Bilbiie, F. O. (2011). Nonseparable preferences, frisch labor supply, and the consumption multiplier of
government spending: One solution to a fiscal policy puzzle. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
43(1):221–251.
Blanchard, O. and Perotti, R. (2002). An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of changes in
government spending and taxes on output. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4):1329–1368.
Branch, W. A. and Evans, G. W. (2006). A simple recursive forecasting model. Economics Letters,
91(2):158–166.
Calvo, G. A. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 12(3):383–398.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. S., and Evans, C. L. (2005). Nominal rigidities and the dynamic
effects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy, 113(1):1–45.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. S., and Rebelo, S. (2011). When is the government spending multiplier
large? Journal of Political Economy, 119(1):78 – 121.
Coenen, G., Erceg, C. J., Freedman, C., Furceri, D., Kumhof, M., Lalonde, R., Laxton, D., Lindé,
J., Mourougane, A., Muir, D., Mursula, S., de Resende, C., Roberts, J., Roeger, W., Snudden, S.,
Trabandt, M., and in ’t Veld, J. (2012). Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural models. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(1):22–68.
Eusepi, S. and Preston, B. (2011). Expectations, learning, and business cycle fluctuations. American
Economic Review, 101(6):2844–72.
Evans, G. W. and Honkapohja, S. (2001). Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Evans, G. W., Honkapohja, S., and Mitra, K. (2009). Anticipated fiscal policy and adaptive learning.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(7):930–953.
Evans, G. W., Honkapohja, S., and Mitra, K. (2012). Does Ricardian Equivalence Hold When Expecta-
tions Are Not Rational? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(7):1259–1283.
Evans, G. W., Honkapohja, S., and Mitra, K. (2016). Expectations, Stagnation and Fiscal Policy. Dis-
cussion Paper 25/2016, Bank of Finland.
21
Fatás, A. and Mihov, I. (2001). The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment: Theory
and evidence. CEPR Discussion Papers 2760, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Fragetta, M. and Gasteiger, E. (2014). Fiscal Foresight, Limited Information and the Effects of Govern-
ment Spending Shocks. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 76(5):667–692.
Galí, J., López-Salido, J. D., and Vallés, J. (2007). Understanding the effects of government spending on
consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(1):227–270.
Gasteiger, E. and Zhang, S. (2014). Anticipation, learning and welfare: the case of distortionary taxation.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 39:113–126.
Guse, E. A. (2008). Learning in a misspecified multivariate self-referential linear stochastic model.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(5):1517–1542.
Honkapohja, S., Mitra, K., and Evans, G. W. (2013). Notes on agents’ behavioral rules under adaptive
learning and studies of monetary policy. In Sargent, T. and Vilmunen, J., editors, Macroeconomics
at the Service of Public Policy, chapter 4, pages 63–79. Oxford University Press, Oxford, United
Kingdom.
King, R. G., Plosser, C. I., and Rebelo, S. T. (1988). Production, growth and business cycles : I. the basic
neoclassical model. Journal of Monetary Economics, 21(2-3):195–232.
Leeper, E. M., Plante, M., and Traum, N. (2010). Dynamics of fiscal financing in the united states.
Journal of Econometrics, 156(2):304–321.
Leeper, E. M., Traum, N., and Walker, T. B. (2015). Clearing Up the Fiscal Multiplier Morass. CAEPR
Working Papers 2015-013 Classification-C, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Eco-
nomics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
Linnemann, L. (2006). The effect of government spending on private consumption: A puzzle? Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(7):1715–1735.
Linnemann, L. and Schabert, A. (2003). Fiscal policy in the new neoclassical synthesis. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 35(6):911–29.
Lucas, R. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1971). Investment under uncertainty. Econometrica, 39(5):659–681.
Milani, F. (2007). Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 54(7):2065–2082.
Mitra, K., Evans, G. W., and Honkapohja, S. (2013). Policy change and learning in the RBC model.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37(10):1947–1971.
Mitra, K., Evans, G. W., and Honkapohja, S. (2016). Fiscal policy multipliers in an RBC model with
learning. Mimeo.
Mountford, A. and Uhlig, H. (2009). What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks? Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 24(6):960–992.
Nakamura, E. and Steinsson, J. (2008). Five facts about prices: A reevaluation of menu cost models. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4):1415–1464.
OECD (2014a). OECD Tax Database. www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.
OECD (2014b). OECD.Stat database. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00285-en.
OECD (2014c). Taxing Wages 2014. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tax_wages-2014-en.
Orphanides, A. and Williams, J. C. (2005). The decline of activist stabilization policy: Natural rate mis-
perceptions, learning, and expectations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29(11):1927–
1950.
Orphanides, A. and Williams, J. C. (2007). Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 54(5):1406–1435.
Perotti, R. (2008). In search of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. In NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 2007, Volume 22, NBER Chapters, pages 169–226. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Ramey, V. A. (2011). Can government purchases stimulate the economy? Journal of Economic Literat-
ure, 49(3):673–85.
Ramey, V. A. and Shapiro, M. D. (1998). Costly capital reallocation and the effects of government
spending. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48(1):145–194.
22
Rotemberg, J. J. and Woodford, M. (1992). Oligopolistic pricing and the effects of aggregate demand on
economic activity. Journal of Political Economy, 100(6):1153–1207.
Slobodyan, S. and Wouters, R. (2012). Learning in an estimated medium-scale DSGE model. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36(1):26–46.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2003). An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the
euro area. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5):1123–1175.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in US business cycles: A Bayesian DSGE
approach. American Economic Review, 97(3):586–606.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Appendices
A Derivations of model equations
A.1 Household’s optimization problem











WtNt + rkt Kt +Rt−1Π
−1
t Bt +Dt −Tt −Ct − It −Bt+1
]
+qt [(1−δ )Kt + It −S (Kt , It , It−1)−Kt+1]
}
.
The associated optimality conditions are
∂Lt
∂Ct
= 0 ⇔ UC,t = λt , (32)
∂Lt
∂ (1−Nt)
= 0 ⇔ U1−N,t = λtWt , (33)
∂Lt
∂Bt+1























+βE∗t [qt+1 (1−δ −SKt ,t+1)] = qt , (36)
∂Lt
∂λt
= 0 ⇔ WtNt + rkt Kt +Rt−1Π−1t Bt +Dt −Tt −Ct − It −Bt+1 = 0,
∂Lt
∂qt
= 0 ⇔ (1−δ )Kt + It −S (Kt , It , It−1)−Kt+1 = 0.














Optimality conditions (35) and (36) can be further simplified using condition (34). We get that











rkt+1 +Qt+1 (1−δ −SKt ,t+1)
]}
, (40)
where Tobin’s Qt ≡ qt/λt .
Functional Form Assumptions The following specifications of preferences and the capital adjustment
















where ςI > 0 is the Lucas and Prescott (1971) capital adjustment cost parameter. For these functional



























































A.2 Firms’ optimization problem
A.2.1 Final goods sector






Pt( j)Yt( j)d j, ∀i ∈ [0,1], (42)
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where both the final goods price Pt and the prices for the intermediate goods Pt( j), j ∈ [0,1], are taken as



















Pt(i)Yt(i)di = 0. (43)








In the symmetric equilibrium all intermediate goods producers set the same price. Therefore, the aggreg-
ate price Pt and the intermediate goods prices Pt(i) for all i will be the same.
A.2.2 Intermediate goods sector
The Lagrangian for the expenditure minimization problem for the intermediate goods producer i is given
by





and the corresponding first-order conditions
Wt = µt(i)(1−α)ZtKt(i)αNt(i)−α ,
rkt = µt(i)αZtKt(i)
α−1Nt(i)1−α .
Here the Lagrange multiplier is also the real marginal cost. Therefore we will define the real marginal
















































Given Calvo pricing, the price index (44) can be written as
P1−εt = (1−θ)(P∗t (i))
1−ε +θP1−εt−1 . (50)
B Log-linearisation
B.1 New Keynesian specification





























(βθ) j E∗t Π̂t+ j+1, (53)
Ŵt = α K̂t + Ẑt + M̂Ct −α N̂t , (54)
r̂kt = (1−α) N̂t + Ẑt + M̂Ct + K̂t (α−1) , (55)
K̂t+1 = K̂t (1−δ )+ Ît δ , (56)
R̂t = ρΠΠ̂t + ûRt , (57)





Ẑt = ρZ Ẑt−1 + εZt , (59)




= Ŵt , (61)














t+ j−E∗t R̂t+ j +β−1E∗t Π̂t+ j
]
, (63)





where a circumflex denotes log-deviations from the steady state.
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B.2 Neoclassical specification
The log-linearised equilibrium conditions characterizing the dynamics of the neoclassical specification















Ŷt = Ẑt +α K̂t +(1−α) N̂t , (66)
Ŵt = α K̂t + Ẑt −α N̂t , (67)
r̂kt = (1−α) N̂t + Ẑt + K̂t (α−1) , (68)
K̂t+1 = K̂t (1−δ )+ Ît δ , (69)
Ẑt = ρZ Ẑt−1 + εZt , (70)




= Ŵt , (72)
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In this appendix we derive the linearised consumption function under learning. We apply the approach
of Evans et al. (2009) and assume agents combine structural knowledge on the government budget con-
straint with expectations based on small forecasting models.
Forward iteration of the Euler equation (41) yields
















where N̂t+ j is substituted out using (61).
Since real government debt is constant under the policy experiment considered in Section 5.2 and by
(3) we can write the household’s flow budget constraint (2) as
β




− D̄Dt + T̄ T̂t , (77)
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where we have used (61) to substitute out labour N̂t . Combining the government budget constraint (60)
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kE∗t r̂
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t+ j + D̄E
∗
t D̂t+ j− ḠE∗t Ĝt+ j
]
(78)
by assuming that the transversality condition (11) holds. Here η = C̄φ−1.
Substituting the Euler equation (76) into this inter-temporal budget constraint yields the consumption
function
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Since the future path of government spending is assumed to be known and given by (28), the term













As described in the main text, the forecasts E∗t Ŵt+ j, E
∗
t R̂t+ j, E
∗




t+ j, and E
∗
t D̂t+ j depend on
the perceived laws of motion (26). In particular, for every variable y f forecasted under learning agents
use the forecast function E∗t ŷ
f




. Here ψy,t is the vector of beliefs in the













where it is assumed that the shock process (59) is known to the agents. From this it follows that
E∗t ŷ
f
t+ j+1 = ψy,tH
j
t Xt , for j ≥ 0, which allows us to obtain the following expressions for the sums in
28
(79):





jE∗t Ŵt+ j = Γ4ψw,tβ (I−βHt)






jE∗t R̂t+ j = Γ3ψr,tβ (I−βHt)







jE∗t Π̂t+ j = Γ3ψπ,t (I−βHt)









t+ j = K̄r̄
k
ψrk,tβ (I−βHt)






jE∗t D̂t+ j = D̄ψd,tβ (I−βHt)
−1 Xt . (90)
In the neoclassical specification of the model, the consumption rule is the same as (79) but without
the term SΠet .
The sums of future expected terms in (13) can be handled in the same way as the sums in the con-
sumption function. By virtue of (84) we obtain the following expression
Q̂t =−R̂t −ψr,tβ (I−βHt)−1 Xt +ψπ,t (I−βHt)−1 Xt +β r̄kψrk,t (I−βHt)
−1 Xt . (91)
C.1.2 Firms
Log-linearisation of the first-order condition (49) yields








(βθ) j E∗t Π̂t+ j+1, (92)
where p∗t (i) = P
∗
t (i)/Pt . In the symmetric equilibrium all intermediate goods producers have identical
marginal costs
M̂Ct = (1−α)Ŵt +α r̂kt − Ẑt . (93)
Combining this expression with (92) and the log-linear approximation of the price index (50) we obtain
condition (19). The sums of future expected terms in (19) can be handled in the same way as the sums










+β (1−θ)ψπ,t (I−βθHt)−1 Xt . (94)
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C.2 Alternative specification of fiscal policy
In all strategies considered in Section 7 the consumption tax rate remains constant. Hence, the linearised
version of the government budget constraint (31) is














= ḠĜt + B̄β−1
(
R̂t−1− Π̂t + B̂t
)
+ ¯T R ˆT Rt . (95)




(1+ τ̄c)C̄+(1− τ̄w)W̄ (1− N̄)
]
Ĉt + K̄K̂t+1− (1− τ̄w)W̄Ŵt − (1− τ̄k)r̄kK̄r̂kt
− B̄β−1
(
R̂t−1− Π̂t + B̂t
)
+ τ̄kr̄kK̄τ̂kt − D̄D̂t − ¯T RT Rt + B̄B̂t+1. (96)
The reaction of the capital income tax rate is given by τ̄kr̄kK̄τ̂kt = ĜtḠ. Combining this expression with
(95) and (96), and following the same steps as in Appendix C.1 we can derive the consumption function
under learning. In particular, the inter-temporal budget constraint of the household and the consumption
function can be written, respectively, as (78) and (79), with β−1 replaced by β̃−1 ≡ r̄k + 1− δ and
η =
[
1+(1−φ)φ−1 (1+ τ̄c)(1− τ̄w)−1
]
C̄.
Optimal investment now requires that






t+1−β τ̄kr̄kE∗t τ̂kt+1. (97)












t+ j−E∗t R̂t+ j +β−1E∗t Π̂t+ j− K̄−1ḠE∗t Ĝt+ j
]
. (98)

















(1+ τ̄c)C̄+(1− τ̄w)W̄ (1− N̄)
]
Ĉt + K̄K̂t+1− (1− τ̄w)W̄Ŵt +W̄ τ̄wτ̂wt − (1− τ̄k)r̄kK̄r̂kt
− B̄β−1
(
R̂t−1− Π̂t + B̂t
)
− D̄D̂t − ¯T R ˆT Rt + B̄B̂t+1. (100)
The dynamics of the labour income tax rate are determined by τ̄wW̄ N̄τ̂wt = ĜtḠ. Combining this expres-
sion with (95) and iterating forward yields the inter-temporal budget constraint of the household. When
(76) is substituted in this constraint, the following consumption function is obtained:
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t are defined above, again with β
−1 replaced
by β̃−1 ≡ r̄k + 1− δ and η =
[
1+(1−φ)φ−1 (1+ τ̄c)(1− τ̄w)−1
]




















The optimality conditions for investment are given by (97) and (98) where government spending and
the capital tax rate drop out.
D Alternative specification of fiscal policy
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the impulse responses to an increase in government spending of 1% of GDP

































































































Labour income tax (τw)
Baseline (lump-sum financing)
Strategy 2: Capital tax financing
Strategy 3: Labour tax financing
Figure 5: Impulse responses to an increase in government spending of 1% of GDP of the new Keynesian
model for different fiscal policy specifications. The solid lines are the responses under rational expecta-
tions; the dashed lines are those under adaptive learning. The impulse response functions are measured






































Strategy 2: Capital tax financing
Strategy 3: Labour tax financing
Figure 6: Expectations on forward-looking variables after a government spending shock of 1% of GDP of
the new Keynesian model for different fiscal policy specifications. The solid lines are the responses under
rational expectations; the dashed lines are those under adaptive learning. The impulse response functions
are measured in percentage deviations from steady-state. The horizontal axis measures quarters.
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